By Alex Bekele.
A struggle which started with a few determined young Amharas with old-style Mauser rifles has now become a giant force of nine Commands, with an average of ten divisions each. All the nine Commands have armed themselves with the latest model individual weapons and heavy artillery, all from the so-called ENDFs. By way of armaments and ammunition, they have everything the enemy has, short of its war planes. They have defeated the enemy practically and literally in all their engagements so far. In the thousands of battles they fought, they have accumulated immense experiences. With their commitment to the security, safety, and well being of the people, they have won their love and loyalty. They have inspired and motivated a whole generation of young Amharas to join the fight for existence. Amharas from Merha Bete, Bete Amhara, Dembecha, and Gayint; all the way to Melbourne, Australia; San Antonio Texas; Quebec, Canada; and Reykjavik, Iceland have joined the fight. How about the Enemy?
It started with a high hope of not only disarming the outdated rifles of Fanos, but also their belts and pants. It, however, only talked the talk, and panted and collapsed while walking the walk. All its forces deployed in Northwest Ethiopia were wiped out in a series of battles. Instead of disarming Fanos’ outdated rifles, they were disarmed of their state of the art war machineries by Fano. The enemy brought more forces that were based in the Southern Region. Their fate was not any different from those of the Northeastern. They brought a bonanza of armaments and ammunition to Fano again. At last, more experienced and battle-hardened forces deployed in Eastern Ethiopia to guard against threats from Somalia were brought in. Fortunately, they proved no match to Fano again, and added still more armaments and ammunition, including heavy artillery, to Fano’s arsenal. The enemy was stupid not only in arming Fano to its teeth, fighting a war it was obviously losing, but also in forcing every young Amhara to join the Fano by its random massacre of civilians and revenge killings. Besides, diverting all resources to this war of genocide, it depleted its National Treasury, and became dependent on Arab petrodollars selling our country to them dirt-cheap. Even then, Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister of Ethiopia, had no control of any sort outside of his Capital, Addis Ababa.
Thus, Fano controlling over 95% of Amhara and dithering from advancing to the capital, but devastating its enemy in its region; and Abiy, his army defeated, himself rejected in Oromo Kilil, and tightly hobbled in Tigray, and barely controlling Addis; appear to be in a stalemate of sorts. Thus, Ethiopia is standing at a crossroad, a little scared and confused which way to go. What caused this scare and confusion? I would argue Fano’s lack of a political party and a clear party program on one hand, and the mismatch between the size of its army and its command structure, regimentation and discipline on the other, has dictated this out of balance stalemate. Out of balance, because Fano has a humongous superiority of force were it not to its drawbacks mentioned above.
Fano never had the luxury to start its struggle with a party leading it. Few individuals embittered by the atrocities of the regime started it and more followed suit. Still more were forced out of their peaceful existence in their villages and towns to the jungle by the enemy. There were also enemy infiltrators planted by the state. This odd mixture of fighters and fellow travelers, withstanding the infiltrators, had successfully defeated the regime and demolished its army. This is a miraculous accomplishment. Yet, it can be squandered if Fano does not come up with a political party.
The biggest danger of not having a political party is the threat of personality cults. Leaders or mid-level leaders who are neither the best commanders nor fighters, nor the most dedicated to the people’s cause can sway a significant portion of the rank and file Fano, bribing and fooling them with trinkets and trivia, and hold the movement hostage, or get to its top and abuse and misuse their power to the detriment of the movement. You can clearly see this in some Fano leaders who have a firm grip on their forces and are always against the formation of a party and a central command. They consider the Fano forces under them as their personal army. And those armies have become a significant source of income, power, status, and pride for them personally. You see them challenged to give them up. They dread a unified party and an army under a central command. The way to change this is to work harder than ever to form the party and work to shift Fano’s loyalty from the individuals to the Party.
The second major cause of the stalemate is the lack of a clear party program. We all know Fano is fighting to stop the Amhara Genocide. We also have a vague and broad idea that Fano should overthrow the regime which is perpetrating the genocide. We also have an even vaguer idea of Fano assuming political power. Frankly speaking, neither we, the people; nor Fano, our liberators, know how exactly. And maybe that is why they couldn’t move forward as the enemy was decimated. A movement without a clearly stated program is like a driver without a GPS in a new big city, too many jolty stops, wrong turns, and maybe even a wreck or two will be expected. Had we had a party program it would have clearly spelled out our enemies and their allies, and ours. It would have had a clear tactic and strategy on how to remove the regime. It would have not only known who our natural allies would be, but also who would be our tactical friends and would have already started coordination. It would have clearly stated how Fano wants to come to power, and what kind of state it wants to establish. What are its economic policies? What is its social agenda? How will it deal with the country’s complex ethnic problems? A party program that answers these questions, educates its members, informs friends and supporters, and keeps the party in its lane is indispensable. Amhara scholars in cooperation with Fano should come up with one urgently.
A party with a program will have to recruit party members, introduce the party program to the people, give political leadership in the army, create undercover party cells in enemy controlled areas, and carry out agitation and propaganda in line with the party program and the Fanos’ military movement. For this you need dedicated and very conscious cadres with the utmost party discipline. The best place to start is a semi-mobile cadre schools in Fano controlled areas which, hand in hand with military training, give intensive political education and instill a refined party discipline in its candidates. Similar efforts of undercover political education and party recruitment should be carried out all over Ethiopia and in the Diaspora. It is not too late.
The other reason for the stalemate is the mismatch between Fano’s size and its scattered command structure and terribly loose regimentation. For a movement that started with individual rebels picking up arms and fighting from the jungle, having nine large commands of ten or more well armed divisions and the coming together of five of them in AFPO only in a year and half is not at all less than a miracle. According to one observation I read on X: “Fano has more armament, more fighting force, more popular support, and a weaker enemy than TPLF marching to Addis in 1991.” Fano deserves all the praise and adulations for this phenomenal accomplishment. Still it has more to do.
An army is as strong as its chain of command. A large army with all the war machineries, but haphazard and scattered command is destined to lose. Size is power only when it is under one leadership with a clear and strict chain of command. The central command should have an unquestionable power to shuffle and reshuffle its manpower and deploy it anytime anywhere it deems necessary. Most of the time, it can do this in response to enemy’s short term and long term war plans or those of its own. Other times it can do it to create a diversified but cohesive fighting force. Still at others, it can do it to forestall a creeping sense of localism and settlement. There are also other military necessities that require you to move your army from one locale to the other, such as making them used to different climates, terrains, cultures, and levels of hostilities. The current multi-command structure of Fano has made all this impossible with negative effect on the struggle.
Fano cannot plan and strategize as one Force. Each Command is doing an excellent job in defending its own area as an end in itself. Despite lip service from some and genuine efforts from others and the founding of AFPO, progress in having a central command has been limited; even member Commands of AFPO still act as separate units.
Ideally, after the formation of AFPO, no unit under its leadership—a platoon, a company, a brigade or a command– should have more than 25% of its fighters from the same area. 75% of its force should come from the other three Amhara regions, each contributing 25%. The leadership should also be diversified in the same manner. Imagine the five Commands of AFPO under one able central command which can shuffle and reshuffle its forces as its war plans require them and deploys them anywhere it deems necessary. Abiy won’t last a week after that. The fighting capability of AFPO will quadruple and quintuple overnight. Besides its effect on combat capability, doing this will discourage localism and nourish organic Amhara nationalism. Amharas will know each other more and dim their minute difference and magnify their core identity. It helps exchange ideas and encourages creativity. In the long run, it even encourages inter-regional marriage and further strengthens unity.
The other problem that possibly can hold Fano back is lack of regimentation. A member of a guerilla army is 24/7 in a combat ready stance. Personal times, meetings, movements, sleeps, and even sanitation breaks are centrally planned and implemented in combat-ready manners. While making sure that combatants have the means to express their grievances, have their say in police directions, and criticize their commanders appropriately, obeying lawful commands and executing missions when ordered cannot be negotiated. Only very limited personal belongings are allowed to facilitate mobility and avoid security problems. Sexual relations of Fanos within the army, and outside are highly regulated. Relations of commanders and fighters, and relations within fighters are constantly evaluated and necessary adjustments are taken in the form of shuffling forces or by other means. Such things as cell phone possessions and uses must be strictly limited and monitored. Family visits are forbidden until the development of Fano can ensure safe annual leaves. Literacy and education within the Fano should be highly encouraged to the extent possible. This magnifies the Fanos human capital, while contributing to cohesion of forces at the same time. Definitely Fano has been doing most of the things I mentioned. It may consider those that it has not been. I am writing only to suggest and provoke a discussion, not to criticize.
In short, with a leading organization with a political program and enlightened party members, and an Amhara Army with a central command and a little more regimentation, the current appearance of a stalemate will evaporate into thin air, and Fano will march to Arat Kilo victorious. As difficult and time consuming this task may appear, with the resources the people of Amhara have it can be achieved sooner than we all can imagine. Believing in the need and starting it is imperative.
Editor’s note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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