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HomeOpinionEritrea And Ethiopia -   Part Four (By Dawit W Giorgis)

Eritrea And Ethiopia –   Part Four (By Dawit W Giorgis)

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By Dawit W Giorgis
Part III – here

The Question of Access to the Sea:

Since there is an inextricable relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia and enormous potential for prosperity and development in peaceful co-existence, all need to understand the legal limits of sovereign power. Understanding Access to the Sea under International law and the historical facts that created a landlocked Ethiopia is an important element of this peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.  

When the TPLF granted Eritrea its independence, Ethiopia lost something of enormous importance to its well-being: access to the sea.  Without Eritrea, Ethiopia is a landlocked country. Access to the sea is one of the keys to the economy of any country. This is universally recognized and was an important part of the discussions on Eritrea’s status after the Second World War. It was a common understanding in all the proposals at that time, that Ethiopia had the right of access to the sea, either by acquiring the entire province of Eritrea, or certain ports.

The famous resolution 390 paragraph C which approved the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, specifically refers to “Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea” as one of the reasons for its decisions.   As a symbol of its determination and its right of access to the sea, Ethiopia had already bought three ships in 1947 that were active in the Red Sea.

 As a condition of its federation with Eritrea in 1950, Ethiopia could have demanded a formal partitioning of Eritrea, incorporating the port of Assab to the mainland to guarantee ownership of a harbor.  It did not make this demand. Ethiopia could also have incorporated Assab into the province of Wello after the abrogation of the federal system when Eritrea was formally a province of Ethiopia. When in 1991 Eritrea wanted to go its way, Ethiopia could also have pointed back to the UN negotiations in the 1940s to insist on its right of access to the sea.  That opportunity was lost because of the clear agenda of the  TPLF to deny Ethiopia this natural and historic right. One reason was TPLF’s dream of establishing  Greater Tigray by annexing Eritrea. I may boldly add that there was no moment in history when Ethiopia was not joined with the Red Sea until the invasion of Italy. History and the accompanying earlier maps show that clearly.    

Under normal circumstances, a long-standing OAU declaration would have effectively barred Ethiopia from demanding Assab in 1991.   That declaration states that countries will abide by the boundaries inherited from colonial times—which would be Eritrea’s boundary at the time of Italian occupation.   But taking into consideration the UN’s role in the 1940s and its commitment to providing Ethiopia with access to the sea, Ethiopia could have established a legitimate argument for access in 1991 either through mediation or by taking the case to court. 

 The TPLF seemed to have no interest in access to the sea and the EPLF was not obliged to provide it. I believe the TPLF never anticipated that their relationship would slowly sour and lead to the stupidest war ever fought, the war on Badme, which caused the death of thousands of troops on both sides and led the two nations into decades of hostility and intransigence.  But more on that in my book.

Another opportunity for Ethiopia to claim the Assab port was during the Badme War in 1999 over the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea.   At one point, Ethiopian troops overwhelmed the Eritrean troops who withdrew from Assab.  I am quite sure Meles knew that Assab was there for the taking (Later confirmed by former Eritrean officials in the book by Dan Cornell: Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners)  without more fighting, but he did nothing. Had he moved in and occupied the port he could have bargained to keep Assab in exchange for Badme, but Meles did not want to. That was the last ‘missed’ opportunity. 

Eritrea will continue to have complete sovereignty over every inch of its territory.  At this point, one way that the argument over access to the sea can be addressed is through the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, which says that landlocked countries must be granted free transit through neighboring states and free access to the sea. According to the Convention: “The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-locked States and transit States concerned through bilateral, subregional, or regional agreements.” In the case of Ethiopia, this ‘free transit’ option is not limited to Eritrea alone but to all its other four neighbors. 

Whatever the calculation of Meles may have been, in not negotiating to maintain the port of Assab, to cut the country off from the sea forever, was misguided and utterly wrong, unpatriotic, and even criminal.  

Conclusion

As mentioned above, in 1950 even if the UN had partitioned or granted Eritrea independence, it would have recognized  Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea. Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea was a fundamental interest which was reflected consistently and emphatically in every draft and every opinion on the future of Eritrea.  The language of Resolution 390 on federation reaffirms this position, calling access to the sea a “legitimate need.”  

“Whereas by paragraph 3 of Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, the Powers concerned have agreed to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly on the disposal of the former Italian colonies in Africa and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it,  Whereas by paragraph 2 of the aforesaid Annex XI such disposal is to be made in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of interested governments,  Now therefore  The General Assembly, in the light of the reports[1] of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea and of the Interim Committee, and  Taking into consideration

(a) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial, religious, and political groups of the provinces of the territory and the capacity of the people for self-government,

(b) The interests of peace and security in East Africa,

(c) The rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea.”

It is explicitly stated: “the rights and claims of Ethiopia.” Ethiopia is still here as a sovereign state minus Eritrea. These rights and claims still exist. Why would it not be possible to claim it now legally? A good argument could be made, but not by the current Ethiopian regime, which thrives on instability both inside the country and with its neighbors. 

As I mentioned in the introduction of this series, a good relationship with Eritrea grounded on mutual economic, security, historical, and cultural interests could also make it easier for Ethiopia to acquire Assab without resorting to such legal means because Eritrea does not even need it. Assab is strategically located to serve Ethiopia’s interests. 

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6 COMMENTS

  1. Thank God, Eritrea is a free and sovereign country. I need to work hard and contrunute more to the development of my mother land, Eritrea. I think cou tries need to respect the sovereignty of other natuons. I don’t think Egypt should claim Ethiopia’s Nile as their own, or, should they?

  2. The new generation of Eritreans, both at home and abroad, is increasingly advocating for peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia and neighboring countries. This vision is rooted in the desire for mutual understanding, dialogue, and cooperation across various sectors such as trade, infrastructure, and regional development. In this spirit, the younger generation believes that as long as Eritrean sovereignty—especially over its territory and coastlines—is respected and upheld, there is room for collaboration, such as granting Ethiopia access to the sea for trade and other transportation needs. This would mark a new era of partnership based on peaceful coexistence and shared interests, benefiting all parties involved.

    However, one point remains clear and non-negotiable: Eritrea is a sovereign state and will never be reunited with Ethiopia or come under its control. This stance is firmly grounded in the historical struggle for Eritrean independence, a hard-won victory after decades of armed resistance and sacrifice. The desire for self-determination and territorial integrity remains central to Eritrean identity and national pride.

    At the same time, Eritrea envisions a future where regions of Ethiopia—or even the entire nation—could choose to align themselves with the Eritrean state, if they wish, under the banner of Eritrean sovereignty. This idea, though bold and unconventional, reflects a deep-rooted belief in the power of unity and collective strength in shaping the future of the Horn of Africa. The aim is not to impose or dominate, but to create a regional dynamic where mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation can flourish, respecting the rights and sovereignty of all nations involved.

    The historical context here is essential. Eritrea’s struggle for independence from Ethiopia, which culminated in 1993 after a brutal 30-year war, has shaped the nation’s political identity. The border conflict of 1998-2000, although formally resolved in 2018 with the peace agreement brokered by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, still resonates in the collective memory of Eritreans. As such, the aspiration for a peaceful future with Ethiopia is tempered by a deep commitment to maintaining Eritrean sovereignty and protecting the gains of independence.

    The current generation seeks to build bridges, not walls, but with the firm understanding that Eritrea’s sovereignty remains inviolable. They are committed to finding a peaceful way forward, based on dialogue, mutual respect, and recognition of the distinct identities and histories of both Eritrea and Ethiopia.

  3. Mr. Woldegioris should direct his criticism at his ally, the totalitarian regime in Eritrea, for it’s stupidity in not using the proceeds of Port usage (just as Djibouti has done) to develop Eritrea and her industrious population who are suffering under oppression and lack of development.

  4. This former Derg mouthpiece is still trying to bring a dead issue back to life. People like him are infected with a disease they can’t be treated for. It is a disease that claims Eritrea was part of Ethiopia for thousands of years. The fact is Eritrea has been an entity with and by its own since the beginning of time. That started changing when some elements at the UN went against the will of the majority of Eritreans and incorporated it with a backward Ethiopia in 1952 under the guise of a federation. Then one day in 1962 the Emperor who was suffering from an unknown disease started making an arrangement to nullify the federal arrangement and make a sovereign nation Eritrea one of his provinces. I was an upcoming Eritrean intellectual at that time and was hired as a legal consultant in his outdated justice ministry.

    One day his Prime Minister summoned me to his office and told me the Emperor wanted to see me. I told him politely that I would respectfully oblige. I went to the palace on the appointed day and bowed to the aging Emperor. After a few questions regarding my assigned job at the ministry, he told me that was not the purpose of our appointment. He tried to lecture me about the false history of Eritrea that it was always part and parcel of Ethiopia if not for the brief separation by the fascist Italy. Then he dropped the bombshell. He told me that all the arrangement was in place to end the federation and make Eritrea a new 14th province of Ethiopia. He asked me what I thought about it. I was blunt about opposing the decision. I told him he will end up awakening a sleeping lion. I could see my response had infuriated him. He abruptly stopped the conversation and walked away.

    Then the next day, my inept boss at the ministry summoned me to tell me I was fired from job but the Emperor was so generous and forgiving that I was assigned at a position in Harar province. That presented an opportunity for me. I was so close to Alemaya Agricultural College which was highly radicalized. That gave me the opportunity to transit their radical pamphlets to their comrades at the college in the capital and high school students in Harar and Dire Dawa. It had also got me closer to Djibouti, Aden and Somalia for easier contact with my Eritrean freedom fighters. The rest was history. My prediction was dead center right. The Emperor’s decision to discard the federation had awakened a sleeping lion in Eritrea. The war raged uninterrupted for 30 years and Ethiopia was unceremoniously kicked out of my country of Eritrea in 1991. This major and others like him must be hallucinating again like the late Emperor. Let me be blunt one more time. Assab was never a port of Eritrea in the books of all Eritreans. Axum was never Ethiopia but part and parcel of Eritrea. Get it all over with.

  5. Here is Dawit W Giorgis, one time governor of Eritrea, sharing his opinion on the future of the two countries. Unlike many scholars who usually strive to score points rather than deliver facts, Dawit tends to show the young generation of both nations the best way out thru the jungle of complex geopolitics. Read him patiently.

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