By Girmay Weldedawit
On November 21, Georgetown University, ECDC, The Open Society Foundations, Refugees International, and Amnesty International USA hosted a virtual conference titled Two Years on from the Pretoria Agreement: What’s Next for Ethiopia? Experts discussed the slow progress in Tigray, ongoing unrest in Amhara and Oromia, and the role international actors, including the U.S., can play in fostering sustainable peace. U.S. Representative Jim McGovern’s opening remarks captured the essence of the discussion: “To say there is fragile peace is an understatement.”
While the conference provided valuable insights into the fragile implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, one critical aspect requires further exploration: does the agreement genuinely represent a resolution between two opposing forces?
The Nature of the Pretoria Agreement
Mehari Tadelle, a prominent Tigrayan intellectual, characterized the Pretoria Agreement as a “Formalized Political Unsettlement.” He explained that such agreements create institutional frameworks where conflicting parties can pursue their objectives through less violent means, effectively “containing rather than resolving” the conflict.
While this characterization captures the theoretical intent of the Pretoria Agreement, its practical reality diverges significantly. The Agreement is not a framework for enabling meaningful engagement between two conflicting parties. Instead, it functions as an accord between the federal government and its affiliates within the TPLF leadership. This dynamic has fractured the TPLF itself: some “signatory” factions operate as an extension of the federal government, while the “non-signatory” faction has been relegated to the status of opposition. Notably, Getachew Reda has asserted that his faction, recognized by the international community as the TPLF, was the legitimate signatory of the deal. In contrast, Debretsion Gebremichael’s faction claims it was the legitimate authority that dispatched the delegates to negotiate and sign the Agreement. Some of the delegates who signed the peace deal have aligned with the federal government, drawing accusations from other TPLF members and factions of betraying both Tigray and the party.
Rather than embodying a true “Formalized Political Unsettlement,” the Pretoria Agreement reflects “A peace spun from the government’s own threads”, a peace process that is self made to suit the government’s interests, that it signed with its shadow.This emphasizes that the agreement is less about resolving conflict between two opposing sides and more about incorporating one faction of the TPLF into the federal government’s fold, effectively turning the conflict inward by sidelining dissenting voices. This arrangement consolidates federal authority while sidelining internal dissent, presenting the illusion of a peace process while fundamentally altering the nature of the conflict.
The Pretoria Agreement and Fracture with in TPLF
Mehari rightly observed that the Pretoria Agreement has failed to deliver on several major elements: the return of displaced persons and restoration of territorial integrity, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), justice and accountability, and political dialogue. However, I disagree with one of the two major reasons he cited for this failure: power and resource politics in Tigray. This view, which is widely held among the Tigrayan political and intellectual elite, is not only reductionist but also overlooks the deeper rift stemming from the belief among TPLF leadership that TPLF and Tigray have been betrayed by their own delegates.The Pretoria Agreement itself has become a fault line.
The contestation begins with the process itself. It is evident that there were separate and secret discussions among a few of the delegates Tigray sent to Pretoria. This can no longer be dismissed as the usual propaganda from the old guard, as Tsadkan has openly confirmed it. This cannot simply be attributed to a matter of convenience between Tsadkan and Getachew’s side, especially given the disputes over the contents and the implementation of the agreement.
A point of significant contention for the TPLF is the dissolution of the state council. Assefa Abraha, a delegate aligned with Getachew, once remarked, “The council was in the initial document but was not in the signed document. I don’t know who removed it.” However, in an interview a few days later, he blamed Debretsion for the omission. This claim is contradicted by statements from both Getachew and Tsadkan, who said they did it. Their reasoning? The federal government claimed Tigray’s election was unconstitutional.
For anyone fluent in Tigrinya and attentive to their body language and tone during these statements, it raises questions about whether they were truly representing Tigray’s interests or acting as delegates for the federal government. For Tsadkan and Getachew, signing the agreement seemed to have a clear objective: dismantling the TPLF leadership.
Their objective was clear: dismantling the TPLF leadership. Their speeches were not merely responses to internal TPLF criticism but reflected a bold conviction that the party needed to be entirely “reformed.” However, their so-called “reform” agenda seems more focused on dismantling the TPLF than addressing the pressing issue of Tigray’s ongoing silent genocide, effectively allowing it to continue unchecked. Serious demands from the TPLF regarding the silent genocide, a referendum, the withdrawal of non-ENDF forces, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), justice and accountability, and the informal ties between TIRA leaders and the federal government are dismissed by Team Getachew as war-mongering. Moreover, they argue that Tigray was defeated and thus had no choice but to accept the agreement and operate on the federal government’s terms. From this defensive stance, they even go so far as to suggest that the TPLF should have agreed to Abiy’s terms before the war, effectively rationalizing Abiy’s genocidal actions in Tigray.
There is strong evidence suggesting that Team Getachew is aligned with the federal government. They publicly defended the release of 400 ENDF soldiers accused of genocide, stating that overseeing genocide-related crimes is the responsibility of the federal government. Moreover, they justified the establishment of TIRA not per the Pretoria Agreement, but through a proclamation that makes TIRA accountable to the federal government. In a recent interview, Getachew Reda even threatened that the federal government would take over the interim administration if TPLF divisions were not settled, further signaling their alignment.
Mehari also described how Tigrayan officials have been reduced to supplicants, begging the Ethiopian government for appointments and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. This description assumes that a unified group signed the agreement. However, I see it differently—one faction in Tigray, affiliated with Abiy, is acting on behalf of the federal government, while the TPLF is seeking a way out. The TPLF, under immense pressure in Tigray and facing a loss of legitimacy after the agreement, had to buy time.
The TPLF remained silent for some time before making a political decision to clarify its stance, carefully considering the situation before declaring which individuals were responsible for betraying the party and committing treason against Tigray. The delay was driven by the public’s intense shock over the Pretoria Agreement, which many viewed as an unfair compromise where Tigray made most of the concessions. For many, the agreement symbolized a subjugation of Tigray’s interests by the TPLF to maintain its political power.Blame was strategically directed at a few individuals, leading to a concerted campaign to scapegoat, label, and dehumanize them. This campaign polarized opinions within Tigray: Tsadkan and Getachew were elevated as heroes by their supporters, while Alem, Debretsion, and Menjorino—mockingly referred to as “ADEME” by Getachew’s activists—were vilified as the villains of the crisis.
Now that many Tigrayans are frustrated with TIRA’s unchecked relationship with Abiy and are aligned with the TPLF, the TPLF has managed to hold its convention and engage in fierce political struggle against what it calls the “Tigray Prosperity Party.” I see this as a tactic to buy time, shift alliances, and prepare for further struggle, including the possibility of war, rather than mere supplicancy. The conditions for war are becoming more evident, as there has been no change in federal government policy towards Tigray—only a shift from an interim government led by Mulunega to an interim administration headed by Getachew, both of which were appointed by Abiy.
lesson from Pretoria Agreement: The prospect of genuine peace deal is dead end
The Pretoria Agreement with the TPLF serves as a cautionary tale: instead of fostering confidence in sustainable peace, it has left the TPLF regretting its choice of delegates and highlighted the fragility of such accords. One could argue that the situation in Tigray post-Pretoria has not only undermined the prospects of peace but has also sent a chilling message to other armed groups, discouraging them from engaging in similar agreements with Abiy’s government.
Tsedale Lema, founder of Addis Standard and a speaker at the webinar, addressed whether the Pretoria Agreement impacts the Oromo Liberation Army’s (OLA) willingness to enter into a cessation of hostilities agreement with the federal government. She noted that, based on information from OLA members and those close to its leadership, this is indeed the case. The lack of commitment to fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement has made OLA members hesitant to trust in the possibility of genuine engagement with the federal government.
Watching what Getachew’s administration is doing in Tigray makes me wonder: Had Jaal Segnie been as farsighted, calculating, and patient as Getachew Reda, he might have positioned himself as the lead negotiator—just as Getachew did for the TPLF—to sign a cessation of hostilities agreement with Abiy Ahmed’s government, effectively dismantling his party, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). While writing this piece, I learned that Jaal Segnie, a splinter from the OLA, has signed a peace agreement with Abiy’s government. There is one difference between Getache and him! Many, including Getachew’s own party, did not suspect him of being affiliated with Abiy when he signed the peace deal. However, Jaal Segnie’s signing of the agreement makes it clear that he is seen as aligned with Shimeli, the president of Oromia appointed by Abiy. His body language and actions exposed him as “Shimeli’s boy,” in contrast to Getachew, whose intentions were not so easily unraveled.
The troubling issue is that Western governments fall in to the narration of Abiy’s government. Evidence suggests that the narrative framing the TPLF as the source of all Ethiopia’s problems was embraced by Western diplomats in Addis Ababa. Sarah Vaughan, a political scientist with deep expertise in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, observed that many Western journalists and diplomats uncritically accepted this narrative(https://youtu.be/R2toMCL50KU?si=4t-WWywPbUFc2zeZ&t=1013?t=5m). Some UN officials blamed the TPLF for provoking the federal government, resisting reforms, and opposing the unity of the country(https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/09/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-united-nations-undp-memo-atrocities-ethnic-cleansing-allegations/). As a result, these officials dismissed credible reports of crimes against humanity during the war (https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2024/06/05/un-response-ethiopia-failure-accountability). Given this context, it is not surprising that federal government officials openly told Pekka Havisto, then EU’s special envoy to Ethiopia, that they would “wipe out Tigrayans for 100 years”(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/18/ethiopian-leaders-said-they-would-wipe-out-tigrayans-eu-envoy). Such sentiments may have been influenced by the perception among Western politicians that a minority group was ruling the entire country and reaping most of the benefits.
Now that it has implemented neo liberal economic reforms , the U.S. and EU has sided with the federal government,opening door for another war.
Western governments are likely to do the same when it comes to other “peace” deals in the rest of the country. Tsedale Lema also criticized the diplomatic community for failing to exert pressure as they did during the Pretoria Agreement. She highlighted how some Western diplomats question the OLA’s motivations, framing the Oromo protests as primarily aimed at removing the TPLF from power. With Oromos now holding key positions in government, these diplomats argue that the OLA’s continued struggle seems unwarranted. Hence, one expects that they are going to appreciate the move by Jaal Segnie at the expense of sustainable peace.
In a November 18 post on X (formerly Twitter), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) sharply criticized Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, stating: “Abiy Ahmed has no peaceful bone in his body. He reluctantly boarded the ‘peace’ bandwagon two years ago, only after his ill-equipped war machine lost steam. Under Bilxiginna, words continue to be stripped of their meaning. First, it was ‘prosperity,’ which delivered only destitution and despair. Now, it is ‘peace,’ cynically rebranded as a euphemism for war“(https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/1858507911330197884).
In a subsequent post on November 28, the OLA suggested that the potential for any genuine peace agreement is effectively dead. The post outlined the group’s view of Abiy’s approach to peace, asserting that its primary purpose is to disarm freedom fighters and consolidate the government’s power ( https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/1862127408628879394 ). This critique underscores the OLA’s deep skepticism about the Ethiopian government’s intentions regarding peace initiatives.).
Therefore, the U.S. and EU should prioritize fostering a genuine settlement of Ethiopia’s conflicts by advocating for an inclusive peace process that addresses the root causes of the tensions. The U.S. must avoid supporting agreements that merely consolidate power for the federal government under the guise of peace, as this risks deepening divisions and prolonging instability. Active U.S. diplomacy should focus on equitable power-sharing, accountability mechanisms, and humanitarian support to promote a sustainable resolution rather than short-term political gains.
Girmay Weldedawit, was a lecturer at Arba Minch University, department of Sociology and Social Anthropology.
Editor’s note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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